Protests Hint at New Chapter in Egyptian Politics by Tamir Moustafa
Protests Hint at New Chapter in Egyptian Politics   
Tamir Moustafa 
Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), April 9, 2004.  
(Reprinted in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Arab Reform 
Bulletin, May, 2004). 
 
 (Tamir Moustafa is assistant professor of political science at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. He recently returned from Cairo.) 
April, 2004 
The week marking the first anniversary of the US-led invasion of Iraq saw a flurry of 
demonstrations across Egypt. A protest in central Cairo marking the beginning of the war 
was followed by a series of demonstrations at al-Azhar and other major universities, as 
well as the lawyers' and journalists' syndicates, upon the Israeli assassination of Hamas 
founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin just three days later. While none of the 
protests matched the magnitude of those that rocked the Egyptian capital in March 2003, 
the constant recurrence of public demonstrations over the past year reveals much about 
how regional crises continue to exacerbate domestic economic and political tensions. 
A NEW KIND OF DISSENT 
On the morning of March 20, as they had the previous year, central security forces 
marched into downtown Cairo's Tahrir Square, making it once again resemble an army 
barracks. The estimated 5,000 security personnel easily contained the 2,000 
demonstrators assembled, but the enormous security presence did not deter protesters 
from publicly indicting the government in a way that was unimaginable only two years 
ago. In the shadow of the massive government building in the square, Nasserists, 
Islamists, leftists and liberals condemned the US occupation of Iraq and bitterly criticized 
the inaction and impotence of Arab governments. A coffin carried through the crowd 
bore the epitaph, "Here lies the Arab League," and demonstrators cried out: "What is 
happening now in Iraq will happen tomorrow in Cairo!" 
But the demonstration turned quickly to expressions of outrage at Egypt's economic 
woes, illustrating deep-seated contempt for the government. Citing price increases that 
have rendered staples like beans expensive and turned meat into an unattainable luxury 
for many Egyptians, the crowd aimed its anger directly at Prime Minister Atef Ebeid. 
"Atef, a kilo of beans now costs six pounds! Atef, a kilo of meat is over thirty pounds! 
Atef, the people of Egypt [are forced to] eat bricks!" Protest leaders underlined the 
staggering economic disparity between rich and poor by calling out to the crowd, "They 
wear the latest fashions!" To which the crowd responded, "And we live ten to a room!" 
Demonstrators also verbally attacked 
the crony capitalists arrayed around 
the regime, who have reaped 
millions from controlled markets. 
"Ahmed Ezz, living in luxury, tell us 
who is protecting you? Down with 
the monopoly of the steel mills!" 
Many have accused Ezz of using his 
prominent positions in the ruling 
party and the People's Assembly to 
consolidate control over the 
Egyptian steel market. Protest 
leaders and demonstrators repeated 
again and again, "Corruption, 
corruption is filling the country -- 
skyrocketing corruption! Where is 
justice? Justice is dead." Toward the 
end of the day, protesters were even so bold as to challenge the regime with the kind of 
words which, only two years ago, no one would have dared to utter in public. "Say to 
Mubarak, say to Sorour, when will you get the hell out of here?" demanded the crowd of 
President Husni Mubarak and Ahmed Fathi Sorour, speaker of the People's Assembly. 
"Down, down with Mubarak!" The chorus continued, "We want a free government, we 
want to build a new country, we want to live a happy life!" 
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FLOATING THE POUND 
Gone are the days when Egypt could claim to be an emerging "tiger on the Nile," in 
reference to the Asian tigers. The structural adjustment program, which in the mid-1990s 
had successfully lowered inflation, attracted foreign investment and generated annual 
growth rates above 6 percent, had stalled by the late 1990s. Structural adjustment entailed 
privatization of numerous state-owned enterprises and laying off many of their workers. 
Yet the remaining bulk of the public sector, still inefficient and overstaffed, continues to 
hemorrhage money. Hard currency reserves, once as high as $15 billion in the mid-1990s, 
now hover at just over $1 billion. Afraid of the potential social and political repercussions 
of further layoffs, the government shelved its plans for further privatization. Foreign 
investors have taken this move as yet another sign of the state's weak commitment to 
comprehensive economic reform. 
The Egyptian pound, long overvalued with its peg to the US dollar, also made Egyptian 
exports less competitive in international markets, further contributing to the balance of 
payments crisis, or the gap between exports and imports. The government had maintained 
the peg in order to maximize hard currency revenues from tourism, despite its long-term 
negative effect on the country's growth potential. But the result was simply to delay the 
political turbulence that would follow the inevitable devaluation. Ironically, when the 
government finally floated the pound in January 2003, most Egyptians saw devaluation 
as a sudden manifestation of economic decline, when in fact the pound had been under 
increasing pressure for years. Not wishing to face the political repercussions of what was 
turning out to be a freefall in the value of the pound, the government intervened and fixed 
the new exchange rate at 6.15 pounds to the dollar, up from 4.2. With dollars virtually 
unavailable in banks and currency exchanges, foreign investors were once again 
discouraged and a black market reemerged, currently trading at around 7 pounds to the 
dollar. 
Devaluation of the pound, while 
necessary for long-term economic 
growth, resulted in rising consumer 
prices and hit government and 
public sector employees on fixed 
incomes especially hard. According 
to a recent study by Heba el-Leithi, 
professor of statistics at Cairo 
University, the inflation rate on 
basic food items alone is now 
increasing at three times its pace 
during the period 2000-2002. The 
government recently announced that 
it will increase subsidies on 
consumer staples and raise the 
salaries of government and public 
sector workers by 10 percent in the 
next fiscal year. However, attempts to cushion the blow of higher prices will not make up 
for the price increases over the past year, much less those that are likely to come in the 
near future. Popular concern over the economy can be heard in every corner of the 
country, not just at demonstrations in Tahrir Square. Reflecting popular confusion over 
the source of the crisis, the pop sensation Shaaban Abd al-Rahim sings about the dollar, 
asking it to "slow down a little.... You're making the prices go crazy. Everything under 




But the economy is not the only thing making Egyptians restless. The second Palestinian 
intifada, now over three years old and bloodier than ever, combined with Iraq's steady 
descent into chaos, has awakened Egypt's typically apolitical masses. Satellite television 
has broken state information monopolies, and the dishes dotting the Cairo skyline beam 
in the latest scenes of US military patrols in Falluja and Israeli incursions into Gaza and 
the West Bank. Demonstrations in support of Palestinian and Iraqi independence have 
become regular occurrences. Although the Egyptian government still hems in 
demonstrations with an overwhelming security presence, the mere fact that protests are 
tacitly permitted outside the gates of university campuses marks a qualitative shift in 
Egyptian political life. 
Still, the government prevents the emergence of organized opposition through arbitrary 
arrest of political activists and selective application of the draconian emergency law and 
emergency state security courts. The Egyptian Popular Committee for Solidarity with the 
Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI), an ad hoc group that attempted to organize relief missions 
to the Occupied Territories and organize rallies in support of Palestinian statehood, has 
faced legal and extralegal intimidation. EPCSPI organizer Ashraf Ibrahim was released in 
early April 2004, after spending nearly a year in solitary confinement for videotaping the 
beating of protesters by security forces at an April 19, 2003 demonstration. Spontaneous 
demonstrations following Sheikh Ahmed Yassin's assassination attracted some 50,000 
protesters nationwide and illustrated once again the extent to which Egyptians are moved 
by events in Palestine, as well as the extent to which events in both Palestine and Iraq put 
the Egyptian state and activists on a collision course. 
Signs of increased political consciousness due to regional tensions can be heard daily 
blaring from storefronts and passing microbuses. Pop singer Shaaban Abd al-Rahim's 
latest hits, "Road Map" and "Striking Iraq," blast the US for its policies toward the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for launching the 2003 invasion. These tunes 
unfortunately appeal to the frighteningly popular conspiracy theory in Egypt that the US 
government itself may have been responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001, in 
order to justify domination of the Arab world. But Shaaban is also critical of the 
incompetence of Arab leaders, a noticeable shift from an earlier song with lyrics praising 
Mubarak and former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. The collapse of the Arab 
League summit even before its scheduled opening on March 28 makes Shaaban's line, "I 
wish for once one of our conferences would be a success," resonate in Egyptian ears. A 
similar lament of Arab impotence, coupled with stinging criticism of US foreign policy, 
can be found in a long-running play at the Cairo Opera House, "Messing with the Mind." 
Without question, the regional political situation has seriously undermined government 
credibility in the eyes of Egyptians from many walks of life, not simply those in 
intellectual circles. 
TALK OF REFORM 
Under increasing pressure from both domestic critics and the international community to 
initiate political reforms, the government has taken a number of steps that sound 
impressive on the surface, but are clearly cosmetic on further inspection. The first step 
was the revocation of law 105/1980, which provided for State Security Courts. The 
government advertised the abolition of the State Security Courts as a great step forward 
for human rights in the country when, in reality, redundancies built into the legal system 
allow the government to exert the same forms of political domination through application 
of the emergency law (in continuous force since 1981). The Emergency State Security 
Courts, which the latter law allows, are still open for business. Moreover, the government 
replaced provisions in law 105/1980 allowing for the detention of any citizen for up to 15 
days without trial with a new provision built into the criminal procedures law effectively 
extending the power of prosecutors to detain anyone for up to six months at a time. In 
practice, the amendment allowing six-month detentions will do little to expand 
government control because, for years, the regime has employed a practice known as 
"recurrent detention," where some 16,000 prisoners at any given time were held for a 
period of 15 days, released on the books, and then immediately transferred back into 
custody for repeated 15-day cycles that sometimes stretch for years. 
Another high-profile reform initiative has been the creation of a National Council for 
Human Rights (NCHR). Justice Minister Farouk Seif al-Nasr calls the council "a striking 
new example of democratic reform in the Arab world." In advance of Mubarak's April 12 
state visit to the US, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, now chairman of the 
NCHR, marketed the body on the op-ed page of the April 7 Washington Post as "Egypt's 
path to rights." But while some observers are encouraged that respected activists like 
Hafez Abu Saada, director of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, and Bahey 
Eddin Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, have been 
appointed to the council, it is unlikely that the NCHR will produce significant results. 
Members are appointed by the government and the council has absolutely no independent 
powers; rather, it serves in a strictly advisory capacity. 
In addition to its institutional deficiencies, the creation of the NCHR should be 
understood in the broader context of government-NGO relations over the past several 
years. The government has waged a protracted campaign against non-governmental 
human rights organizations with a variety of tactics, including cutting off foreign funding, 
smear campaigns in the state-owned press, and last but not least, two new associations 
laws (the first of which was struck down by the Supreme Constitutional Court in 2000). 
Through associations law 84/2002, the Ministry of Social Affairs has the power to reject 
or dissolve any association it deems to threaten "public order or public morality." The 
government proved its resolve to apply the full force of the law when it refused to grant 
legal recognition to the Egyptian Association Against Torture, the New Women's 
Research Center and the Land Center for Human Rights.  
The simultaneous assault on independent human rights NGOs and the creation of the 
state-dominated National Council for Human Rights fits the classic pattern of corporatist 
political engineering in modern Egypt, which the regime has employed to great effect in 
controlling just about every area of political and associational life, including labor unions, 
religious institutions, professional syndicates and opposition parties. Nasser Amin, 
director of the Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, 
contends that the NCHR is designed to "give the façade of human rights guarantees and 
nothing more." Amin argues that "if the government truly wanted to implement reforms, 
it could repeal the emergency laws, dismantle the emergency state security courts, restore 
the complete independence of the judiciary, release prisoners detained without trial and 
put an end to the rampant use of torture in prison." 
VOLATILE MIX 
A sober assessment of the deteriorating economic situation, the ever more explosive 
regional context, increasing government reliance on authoritarian modes of rule and, 
most importantly, the volatile interaction of these three variables with one another, can 
leave one with a fairly pessimistic view of what might be in store for Egypt. But in the 
midst of such difficulties, some activists and political observers are emboldened by the 
increasing political consciousness of ordinary Egyptians. They rightly cite broad-based 
political consciousness and social mobilization as necessary (if not sufficient) ingredients 
that were largely missing from reform efforts in the 1990s. The critical question that 
remains is whether rising levels of popular discontent can be organized and channeled in 
such a way as to become a productive force for positive change. 
 
